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As the difficult and complex peace negotiations for Syria demonstrate, international mediators 
struggle with how to secure a lasting ceasefire, shore up groups’ commitment to forging a 
settlement and establish institutional options that will consolidate peace and an inclusive 
democratic state. More than twenty years of international practice suggests that power sharing 
is becoming the dominant approach favoured by third-party mediators for building state 
capacity and legitimacy in deeply divided societies. Power sharing facilitates co-decision-
making opportunities between ethnic or national majorities and minorities in government; in 
cases of violent conflict, it is also used to facilitate joint decision-making between former 
combatants.  
 
Despite its burgeoning popularity, power sharing can be an unstable approach to conflict 
transformation. While it has proven effective in the short and medium term (McCulloch, 2014; 
McEvoy, 2015), over time it is prone to political crises arising from the legacy of the conflict. 
The resolution of such crises often entail either the prolonged engagement of external actors in 
order to restabilise the agreement, as with the extended international mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, or the re-engagement of external actors in order to defuse crisis moments, as with 
high level talks in Northern Ireland jointly sponsored by the British and Irish governments. 
Nonetheless, external actors continue to promote power-sharing arrangements to manage self-
determination disputes and ethnic conflicts. 1  This presents a puzzle. External actors are 
generally motivated to find resolutions with clear exit strategies; that they continue to 
recommend arrangements that only prolong their involvement in conflict transformation is thus 
curious. 
 
This article investigates the reasons why third-party mediators turn to power-sharing strategies 
during peace negotiations. The article draws on in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
officials from the United Nations and the European Union working for the organizations’ 
respective mediation units as well as documentary analysis of official mediation documents, 
such as the UN Guidance on Effective Mediation and the EU’s Concept on Mediation and 
Dialogue Capacities. We interviewed approximately 20 officials working for the respective 
mediation units and our questions sought to uncover their views on why power-sharing is often 
recommended as a feasible and potentially fruitful set of institutional arrangements to help 
secure peace and democracy in conflict-affected, deeply divided places. Drawing on these 
interviews and relevant documents, we argue that international mediators recommend power 
                                                 
1 External actors include states, international organizations, regional organizations, non-governmental 
organizations and private individuals. The US has been a leading democracy-promoter for some time, often 
promoting political institutions based on group rights including power sharing, what Lise Howard terms 
‘ethnocratic solutions’ (see Howard, 2015). 
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sharing for both pragmatic and normative reasons. Specifically, we outline four possible 
explanations for their support of such arrangements, drawing on international law, regional and 
internal security considerations, support for democracy and minority rights, and what we might 
call an agnostic approach whereby mediators focus on the mechanics of power-sharing designs 
at the request of domestic actors. In highlighting these different approaches, we find that each 
third party mediator often brings their own existing preferences to the table, which has the 
potential to render each new negotiation sui generis. In the conclusion we consider the 
implications of our findings for on-going and future international mediation processes.  
 
Power-Sharing Problems: Adoption and Implementation 
 
Scholarship on post-conflict institutional design highlights ‘the new wave of power-sharing 
democracy’ whereby such arrangements are established through international engagement and 
oversight (Taylor, 2009: 7). External actors have facilitated power-sharing adoption and 
implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Sudan and 
Macedonia and they have recommended such arrangements for Cyprus, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Libya, Nepal and Syria. Third parties have been shown to play a 
crucial role in incentivising contending groups to adopt, maintain and reform power-sharing 
institutions (McEvoy, 2014, 2015). That is, external actors can facilitate both the adoption and 
the implementation of power-sharing settlements. 
 
The input of external actors in post-conflict institutional design sheds light on what Horowitz 
(2014) terms the ‘adoption problem’ whereby little is known about the conditions under which 
power sharing can be adopted. Horowitz argues that the adoption problem is ‘surpassingly 
important’ constituting ‘a congeries of bargaining problems’, including the presence of 
asymmetric preferences between majorities and minorities; a reluctance to adopt novel 
institutions; negotiators’ bias which restricts the range of options under consideration; and 
perceptions on the part of the parties as to which institutions meet their preferences as a 
‘perceived visibility of interests’ (Horowitz, 2014: 8-9). McGarry (2017) suggests that 
adoptability goes beyond just finding a set of institutions that parties find acceptable; 
‘agreement on additional matters not directly related to power-sharing’ may also be required 
before a settlement can be put in place (i.e., security arrangements, property matters, refugee 
return and resettlements). To this end, ‘motivational elements’ may also be required to 
overcome the adoption problem, including ‘external pressures, demographic changes, 
economic opportunities, and hurting stalemates’ (McGarry 2017: 17). Certainly, Richard 
Holbrooke’s depiction of the Dayton negotiations for Bosnia-Herzegovina – ‘For twenty-one 
days, we cajoled, harassed and pressured the participants’ (2011: 220) – suggests that external 
actors are prepared to exert such pressures. 
  
In terms of power-sharing implementation, scholars have long debated whether such 
institutions facilitate political stability. Critics outline two central concerns. First, they worry 
that power sharing incentivises political extremism and ethnic outbidding (Jarstad, 2008; 
Roeder and Rothchild, 2005). Such outbidding is liable to lead to collapse, unless one party is 
prepared to back down. According to Sisk and Stefes (2005: 297), ‘when power-sharing 
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arrangements lead to such political immobilism (i.e., the inability to make or implement policy 
due to protracted disagreement), frustrations emerge, and one or more parties defect from the 
accord.’  Concession, however, can be dangerous: concede too much and the party risks being 
labeled as sell-outs, losing voter support as well as their credibility as coalition partners 
(McCulloch 2016). Defection meanwhile can lead to the resumption of violence. Horowitz 
(2014) labels this the ‘immobilism problem.’ Power sharing often entails prolonged periods of 
coalition-building as well as protracted legislative decision-making. Voluntary interethnic 
coalitions are difficult to form and vetoes and other delaying tactics have the potential to 
encumber legislative decision-making (McEvoy, 2013; McCulloch, 2017). External actors 
respond to the implementation problem with a variety of carrots and sticks, from helping to 
clarify, streamline or renegotiate aspects of the original deal (i.e., Northern Ireland) to offering 
new terms of engagement (i.e., EU accession incentives in Macedonia), the re-deployment or 
strengthening of peacebuilding missions (i.e., Burundi), to directly overruling local actors and 
imposing new policies (i.e., Bosnia).  
 
Despite this twofold problem of adoption and implementation, power sharing still holds 
considerable appeal. Both academic proponents and policy practitioners argue that power 
sharing is critical to ending war and rebuilding state capacity, that state legitimacy turns on its 
inclusiveness and representativeness, and that power sharing is a democratic means for 
accommodating identity differences and incentivising cooperation, which contributes to both 
capacity and legitimacy (Walter, 2002; McGarry and O’Leary, 2009; Wolff, 2011; McCulloch, 
2014; McEvoy, 2015). Political elites, Lijphart (2008, 269) claims, also see the appeal of 
sharing power:  ‘the logic is so compelling that time and again political leaders of deeply 
divided societies have spontaneously turned to consociationalism as the most obvious way to 
solve their conflicts’. In the following section, we consider whether external actors share this 
predilection for power sharing. 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the pursuit of power-sharing agreements favors a 
conflict management approach, the objective of which is to channel ‘the violent manifestation 
of an incompatibility of goals’ between parties ‘into a political process where their disputes 
can be addressed by non-violent means’ (Yakinthou and Wolff, 2013, p. 1). In this way it seeks 
to regulate conflict, not resolve it, and consequently falls short of a foundational critique of, 
and emancipation from, the sources of conflict (Pugh 2013). To this end, power-sharing has 
been criticized as a status-quo strategy that works within the extant structure of the international 
state-system to resolve ethnic conflicts. In seeking to uphold Westphalian notions of territorial 
sovereignty and the liberal peace, it fails to see that “such conflicts may, in part, be brought 
about by that system itself” (Richmond, 1999, p. 192). And as a practical, instrumental and 
somewhat technocratic solution for managing violent conflict, power-sharing may be viewed 
as a ‘problem-solving’ approach.2 Our interviewees recognized the constraints within which 
their mediation efforts could operate and the range of recommendations to which they must 
remain committed. 
                                                 
2 There is a large literature that critiques problem-solving approaches as reinforcing the social structures that 
cause conflict in the first place (Bellamy, 2004; Richmond, 2006; Pugh 2013). 
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Mediation Efforts at the International and Regional Level 
 
International mediators seeking to resolve self-determination disputes and ethnic conflicts face 
a series of complex and confusing political and legal questions. Broadly defined, mediation 
constitutes ‘assisted negotiation’ whereby ‘conflicting parties gather to seek solutions to their 
problems, accompanied by a mediator who facilitates discussion and the flow of information, 
aiding in the process of reaching agreement’ (Bercovitch, 2006: 290). In a research field that 
has grown considerably in recent years, questions regarding the conditions for successful or 
effective mediation remain unresolved (Bercovitch 2006; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). 
 
Mediation has become ‘increasingly embedded’ within the structures and programs of both 
international organizations and states (Lanz, 2011: 278). Different mediators come to the table 
with difference skills, resources, and preferences. The United Nations has a different set of 
strengths (i.e., moral authority, global scope) and limitations (i.e., lack of overarching 
authority, coordination problems among its component parts) than regional and non-
governmental organisations (Kittikhoun and Weiss, 2012). Regional organisations, such as the 
European Union, have become more engaged in mediating intra-state conflict within their 
neighbourhood and further afield (Pevehouse, 2002). As demonstrated in the creation of the 
2009 Concept on Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, the EU has sought to provide 
increasingly formalized mediation support to the UN’s lead, thereby developing its own status 
as a global player in conflict resolution. The development of the EU’s mediation role fits 
squarely with its overarching strategic vision (Tocci, 2016). NGOs have also taken on a more 
salient role in conflict mediation than was previously possible (Lanz 2011). The further 
institutionalization of mediation expertise in international organizations, regional organizations 
and NGOs adds to the ‘bureaucratization of positive peace’ that is critiqued for limiting local 
ownership in peace processes (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009). Acknowledging the influence 
of a ‘bureaucratized peace’, we do not yet know how mediators approach the range of potential 
institutional options and under which conditions they do or do not recommend power sharing.  
 
The United Nations Mediation Support Unit and Standby Team of Mediation Experts 
 
The UN is one of the most visible actors engaged in mediation and peace-making efforts. As 
an intergovernmental organization, the UN is often seen a composite actor subject to the whims 
of great power politics, but there is also reason to treat it as a unitary actor (Iji, 2017; Lanz, 
2011; Convergne, 2015). While previously its mediation activities were ad hoc, much of the 
UN’s mediation work is now streamlined through the Department of Political Affairs and its 
Mediation Support Unit (MSU). Created in 2006, MSU oversees four layers of mediation 
support: in-house experience, a rapid-response Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT), a 
roster of over 200 mediation experts and partnerships with think-tanks and NGOs. We are 
particularly interested in the SBT, given that it has included a Senior Expert on Power-Sharing 
since its inception in 2008. 
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The SBT is tasked with providing ‘technical advice to United Nation’s officials and others 
leading mediation and conflict prevention efforts’ (MSU n.d.). Members of the team, often 
recruited from academia, are expected to deploy within 72 hours (though the turnaround time 
can be shorter). The team structure has been compared to a ‘Swiss Army Knife’ model of 
mediation in that it has ‘multiple but separately deployable elements within one mechanism’ 
(Herrberg et al, 2015). Indeed, it is rare for members to deploy as a whole team: ‘You often 
don’t need a natural resource, constitution, power sharing, gender and process design expert 
all at the same time so I think the way they set it up actually is much more efficient but it does 
mean that we hardly ever see each other’ (personal interview, SBT member, 2016). They are 
not deployed as UN staff but as independent experts; the arrangement has been described as a 
‘unique semi-autonomous model [that] blends independence from and ownership by the UN’ 
(Herrberg et al, 2015). Their role is to offer thematic expertise on a variety of issues, including 
security arrangements, natural resources, constitutions, process design, transitional justice, 
gender and social inclusion, and power sharing. Members deploy at the request of current UN 
Envoys, other UN departments and agencies, UN field missions, regional or sub-regional 
organizations, NGOs, and (less often) member states  (personal interview, DPA, 2016).  
 
Team members can take on various roles in a mediation effort including ‘providing technical 
expertise in a specific area; giving advice on procedural and agenda-setting issues; providing 
analysis of the positions of parties in negotiations, including the identification of potential 
points of convergence as well as possible gaps; drafting the text of agreements; leading 
workshops for parties on substantive or process issues; and providing specialised mediation 
training and coaching’ (DPA, 2014). According to Herrberg et al (2015: 34), the team deploys 
in four different kinds of scenarios: ad hoc (quick fix deployments); gap filling (fact-finding 
missions); stop-gapping (discrete technical expertise and/or facilitation); and playing a 
role/becoming part of the fixture, with stop-gapping and gap-filling increasingly more 
common. Between 2008 and 2015, team members deployed more than 330 times across the 
eight thematic areas, including in Cyprus, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Malawi, Sudan, and Somalia. 
Given their quick deployment to global hotspots, one SBT member has rightly described the 
team as ‘mediation firefighters’ (Zahar, 2016). 
 
From the outset, power sharing has been a key component of the SBT; indeed, it has been “the 
only specific constitutional model for which they have sought a specialist” (Yakinthou and 
Wolff, 2012, p. 2). While some of the other areas have shifted over the years (e.g., gender was 
not a thematic area in the first iteration but included thereafter), the position of Senior Expert 
on Power Sharing has remained relatively consistent. Some of the past senior experts include 
well-known scholars of institutional design and conflict management, who between them bring 
differing assessments of the benefits of power sharing. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary 
(2009) are well-known proponents of consociationalism whereas George Anderson’s (2007) 
expertise is on federal arrangements; Christina Murray and Scott Smith focus on transitional 
executive power sharing arrangements (Smith, 2016; Murray and Cheeseman, 2017); and 
Marie-Joëlle Zahar has taken a generally more sceptical view of power sharing in the past 
(Sriram and Zahar, 2011). MSU and SBT take a deliberately broad approach: ‘obviously power 
sharing means a lot of different things to different people and there’s various subsets to power 
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sharing…including federalism, autonomy arrangements, asymmetric autonomy 
arrangements…and governments of national unity’ (personal interview, MSU, 2016). Indeed, 
at least one former SBT member cautioned us against assuming that there is a single ‘UN voice’ 
on power sharing.  
 
This open-ended approach is consistent with the UN’s mediation guidelines, which require a 
combination of generalized and case-specific knowledge. A Manual for UN Mediators (2010) 
and the Mediation Start-Up Guidelines (2011) speak to the importance of the technical aspects 
of power sharing in mediation. Both documents emphasize the need for mediators and experts 
to draw from experiences in other countries but to tailor technical power-sharing 
recommendations to the case at hand: mediation experts can ‘advise on options for resolution 
using comparative experiences from other countries’ on deployment (DPA, 2011) and can also 
offer their expertise through advisory papers. While the technical details of implementation 
may vary from case to case, there is also a predisposition to generally support power sharing 
implicit within the mediation documents.  
 
How does the UN see the problems of adoption and implementation? The mediation documents 
make only passing reference to the adoption problem, and do so in broad terms about the nature 
of peace agreements, rather than anything specific to power sharing. Likewise, implementation 
is only discussed in broad terms. As the Manual (2010: 46) makes clear: ‘peace agreements 
must satisfy certain criteria to withstand the stress of implementation’. Yet it is also clear that 
SBT members do consider such challenges. Writing about the Cypriot negotiations, McGarry 
(2017: 32) calls for a greater focus on the issue of adoptability – after all ‘what is adoptable is 
not necessarily what is optimally functional’. According to another senior expert, ‘a common 
feature of these power-sharing arrangements is they need constant maintenance’ (personal 
interview, 2016). Nonetheless, when asked about the initial recommendation of power sharing, 
they suggested it comes from ‘a lack of alternatives’, and from a ‘tactical’ motivation’: ‘unless 
there is an outright victory… in these post-conflict situations I think the convergence, the 
dynamics, the power analysis’ lead toward power sharing (personal interview, SBT member, 
2016). Each team member, it appears, confronts these challenges in their own way. 
 
The European Union and the Mediation Support Team 
 
Mediation has always been at the heart of the European integration project given the 
organisation’s own experience as a post-war peace project. The development of the EU’s 
formal capacities in international mediation can be traced to the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) of 2003 and the Secretary General/High Representative’s 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS, which recommended the expansion of the EU’s mediation 
capacities (SG/HR, 2008). In November 2009 the Council of the European Union adopted the 
Concept on Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, which aimed to establish a more coordinated 
and focused approach to EU mediation and thus enhance the EU’s status as a global actor in 
conflict resolution (Council of the European Union, 2009). The Concept’s goals include 
strengthening EU mediation support capacity, providing training for EU officials, supporting 
local mediation efforts and cooperating effectively with other mediation actors, principally the 
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UN and other regional organisations such as the African Union and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations. Stating that ‘The EU is a global actor and its political, developmental 
and security interests go well beyond its neighbourhood’, the Concept positioned the EU as a 
potential lead in mediation efforts while highlighting the importance of coordination with 
others (Council of the European Union, 2009: 9). The Concept identified various ways in which 
the EU could pursue its mediation activities: promotion of mediation as a means to resolve 
conflict; leveraging mediation; supporting mediation efforts of others through training and 
providing expertise; and funding mediation efforts. Notably, mediation was to be part and 
parcel of the EU’s ‘comprehensive toolbox in the area of conflict prevention and crisis 
management’. A range of EU actors have since been involved in mediation activities: the 
Secretary General/High Representative, the EU Presidency, European Commission, EU 
Special Representatives, ESDP/CSDP missions and European Commission delegations. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty (in force from late 2009) established new structures in EU external relations 
including the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and Vice President of the 
Commission, responsible for the operation and coordination of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). The EEAS’s ‘Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation’ division 
supports various EU units in their conflict resolution efforts. Within the division, the Mediation 
Support Team (MST) is the principal unit responsible for promoting mediation and dialogue 
and is ‘tasked with supporting EU institutions and partners with advice, technical expertise and 
real-time support before, during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts’ (EEAS Factsheet, 
n.d.). The MST offers operational support and expert deployments (from the in-house team as 
well as a roster of more than 70 specialised experts), support and training, and is responsible 
for developing mediation partnerships with other organisations (UN, AU, ASEAN and NGOs). 
The team’s remit has focused on helping the EU ‘assume a more active role internationally in 
support of peace’ (EEAS Factsheet, nd). 
 
Although the 2009 Concept set out an ambitious plan for the EU as a global actor with potential 
to act as lead or co-mediator in peace negotiations, MST officials acknowledge that the EU’s 
role cannot compare to the UN’s global reach and ultimately seeks to support UN efforts 
(personal interview, 2017). EU mediation, and the MST’s work, is positioned in a broad 
manner encapsulating political, financial and technical support to the UN. Apart from the case 
of Kosovo/Serbia, cases of the EU acting as the lead mediator are rare. Notably, the MST was 
named Mediation Support Team to reflect its nature ‘as a smaller entity’ than the UN’s MSU 
(personal interview, 2017). Despite the differences in size and remit, the MST has adopted a 
similar framework to the MSU by pitching itself ‘as a horizontal service provider’, offering a 
service to interested parties. In performing a ‘niche-fulfilling role’, EU mediation capacity 
benefits substantially from the organisation’s financial leverage in funding mediation efforts 
(personal interview, 2017). This financial leverage has allowed the EU to perform key roles in 
several peace processes, as in Mali where the EU has had a key role in supporting the 
implementation of the 2015 peace agreement owing to its financial contribution (EEAS, 2016).  
 
In relation to constitutional design, MST officials have had a series of coaching workshops to 
better understand the merits and limitations of power sharing in conflict-affected states. Unlike 
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the UN, the MST does not have a formal institutional structure as per the SBT including experts 
on power sharing. Highlighting the different mandates and structures of the two mediation 
units, EU mediation is more often about supporting the framework set up by the UN, ‘so our 
possibility to influence and change the fundamental parameters of the mediation are often quite 
limited’ (personal interview, MST, 2017). In performing this supportive role to UN-driven 
mediation efforts, the MST and other units within EEAS have spent time considering the 
conditions under which the EU should support power sharing. There have been efforts to assess 
the EU’s experience in supporting power sharing and how such experience can help inform on-
going mediation efforts in relation to cases including Libya and Syria. 
  
Why External Actors Recommend Power Sharing: Four Perspectives 
 
A central finding from our research is that there is, in fact, no single approach to power sharing 
or its recommendation in cases of deep ethnic division and violent intra-state conflict. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to articulate a range of reasons why external actors support power-
sharing settlements. Here we offer four possible perspectives, which we derived from our 
interviews, recognizing that each mediation actor may have their own preferences or may bring 
a mix of perspectives to the table.   
 
Perspective I: International Law 
 
External actors operate in a complex international legal environment and need to adhere to 
general principles of international law as well as to their own organization’s rules. As the UN 
Manual stresses: ‘UN mediators are expected to be impartial but not neutral, i.e., they should 
be constant advocates for the principles of the United Nations, as embodied in the Charter’ 
(2010: 23). This includes the proscription on amnesties in UN-mediated processes and how to 
deal with those indicted by the International Criminal Court, as well as broader principles of 
international law, such as the right to self-determination and territorial integrity. Likewise, EU 
mediators are expected to be impartial in facilitating agreement between the conflict parties, 
also upholding democratic values and human rights norms (personal interview, 2017).  
 
Often the nature of the conflict in deeply divided societies concerns the contending groups’ 
divergent self-determination claims. Since 1945, more than seventy armed conflicts over self-
determination have broken out (Gallagher Cunningham, 2014: 3). External mediators must 
adopt a careful stance, facilitating group constitutional preferences so as to help prevent 
recurrence of conflict but within the parameters of the right to self-determination. The principle 
of self-determination has been defined broadly as ‘the notion that ethnic groups have the right 
to determine their own fate’ with territory being central to such claims (Duffy Toft, 2012: 584). 
This can either mean the pursuit of greater autonomy within the existing state or ‘the group 
may come to feel entitled to a state of its own, either out of fear for its survival or out of a sense 
of positive destiny’ (Duffy Toft, 2012: 584). Yet the meaning and content of self-determination 
remain contested; there is a clear tension between self-determination and territorial integrity 
and state sovereignty. In practice, the application of the right to self-determination has tended 
to be limited to colonial situations. Fabry (2015: 500) discusses the ‘conscious and deliberate 
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subordination of all non-colonial notions of self-determination to the principle of territorial 
integrity’. For example, UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 contains the statement that 
‘any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations’. The reasons for this international commitment to territorial integrity over self-
determination claims are explained by several factors including concerns of a potential 'domino 
effect of never-ending secessionist bids' and fear of violent conflict (Fabry, 2015).3  
 
Constrained by the need to provide options that can reconcile self-determination and territorial 
integrity, mediators are likely to turn to complex power-sharing arrangements, which is seen 
as a middle way between these norms. By combining traditional rules on power sharing with 
strong forms of territorial self-governance, complex power sharing is thought to provide 
incentives for resolving self-determination claims in a peaceful manner (Wolff, 2009). The 
rationale is pragmatic: the parties do not have to choose between two compelling legal norms 
but can settle for a satisficing solution. Conflict parties, too, have sometimes presented power 
sharing as an approach that supports state sovereignty but which also recognizes the profound 
mistrust between minority groups and the state (personal interview, SBT member, 2017). EU 
mediators have assessed the ‘trade-off’ between Kosovo’s ‘territoriality’ and proposed power 
sharing and decentralised structures for the Serbian community in northern Kosovo (personal 
interview, 2017). EU mediation efforts in this case were focused on ‘devising a middle ground’ 
between the conflict parties with elements of power sharing part of the solution (personal 
interview, 2017). Yet there are consequences to this pragmatic rationale. While such 
pragmatism confronts the problem of adoption, it leaves open the implementation problem. 
International courts are beginning to challenge the democratic credentials of consociational 
pacts, arguing that they infringe the right not to be treated on the basis of particular prohibited 
characteristics, such as race or ethnicity (McCrudden and O’Leary, 2013). How mediators take 
these legal developments into account in their conflict resolution efforts still remains to be 
seen.  
  
Perspective II: Regional and Internal Security 
 
Conflict resolution efforts on the part of the UN and the EU ultimately aim to enhance 
international peace and security. In the context of mediation activities to resolve intra-state 
conflict, cross-communal power sharing has been viewed pragmatically as a means to stop 
violence and facilitate security both within the conflict-affected state and beyond its borders 
(O’Leary 2005).  
 
                                                 
3 There has, however, been some inconsistency as the unilateral secession of Bangladesh in 1972 and recognition 
of an independent Kosovo illustrate. The International Court of Justice’s 2010 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo 
facilitated the acceptance of Kosovo’s independence but resisted any move to develop international law in a 
direction that would provide a right to secede. In respect to Kosovo, the international community, and in particular 
the European Union, has remained divided on the issue of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia and its associated 
recognition (see Oeter, 2014; Walter, 2014).     
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Power sharing, for example, has been a central component of the post-conflict transitions in 
several Western Balkans states. For external actors involved in these transitions, power sharing 
is regarded as a means to enhance both internal and regional security. Former EU Special 
Envoy and High Representative to Bosnia Carl Bildt suggests that power sharing had to work 
because ‘Secession by one community is as unacceptable as dominance by one’ (OHR, 1996). 
Even though the EU supports power sharing in Bosnia, it has long called for constitutional 
reforms to help improve functionality (Sebastian, 2009) and has continued to push for specific 
reforms to address the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.4 Efforts to 
resolve the conflict in Macedonia in 2001 were also shaped by security concerns both within 
the state and in relation to the crisis in neighbouring Kosovo (McEvoy, 2015: 164-65). US 
representative James Pardew (2011) who worked with EU representative Francois Leotard to 
broker the Ohrid Framework Agreement has written about how their mediation efforts must be 
seen in the regional context of conflict related to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.  
 
In the more recent case of EU-led mediation on Kosovo/Serbia, a deal brokered by EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton in April 2013 aimed to implement power sharing between the 
Serb majority areas of northern Kosovo and the ethnic Albanian-led Kosovo central 
government (RFE/RL, 2013). The ‘high level dialogue’ between the prime ministers of Kosovo 
and Serbia, facilitated by Ashton, addressed the situation of the Serbian minority community 
in Kosovo ‘which would meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a way 
that ensures the functionality of a single and institutional and administrative set up in Kosovo’ 
(European Commission, 2013: 6; personal interview, 2017). The discussions on northern 
Kosovo concluded with the ‘First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of 
relations’ providing for an Association/Community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo 
(European Commission, 2013: 7). The administrative reforms to address the needs of the 
Serbian minority have been part of Kosovo’s preparations for its Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with the EU, which came into force in April 2016. The SAA is positioned 
as helping to facilitate ‘the establishment and consolidation of a stable European order.’ The 
SAA’s aim is to contribute to the ‘political, economic and institutional stability in Kosovo, as 
well as to the stabilisation of the region’ (Art.1, SAA, 2016). 
 
Power sharing has also been recommended in constitutional design processes in the Middle 
East to help stabilize individual states as well as the wider region. In the case of Iraq, there was 
an acknowledgement by various external actors that a significant governance problem related 
to the concentration of power at the state level and its dominance by one community. To help 
transition the country towards inclusive representative democracy and prevent the recurrence 
of violent conflict, constitutional reform proposals focused on power sharing at the centre and 
the creation of a pluri-national federation involving decentralization of authority to 
                                                 
4 The European Commission continues to remind the Bosnian authorities that the constitution remains in breach 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as per the ruling in the Sejdić-Finci case (as well as in 
two subsequent cases) and needs to be amended (European Commission, 2016). In the ruling of December 
2009, the Court found that the applicants’ inability to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the 
Presidency violated the ECHR regarding ethnic discrimination for representation in institutions for persons not 
belonging to the three constituent peoples. 
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governorates and municipalities (O’Leary, 2009). In the context of the subsequent violence 
carried out by ISIS/Da’esh, the UN has sought to shore up cross-communal cooperation at the 
state level, wider societal reconciliation and the support of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
to improve internal stability (UN News, 2016). In Afghanistan, following allegations of 
election fraud at the June 2014 presidential election, the UN supervised an audit of votes and 
helped deliver a deal whereby Ashraf Ghani became president and Abdullah Abdullah was 
appointed to a new chief executive position. For the UN team engaged in resolving the issue, 
the threat of violence on the part of the losing side directed the talks toward power sharing 
(personal interview, 2016). Moreover, the power-sharing deal was considered a solution to a 
weakness of the constitution, which invested considerable power in the presidency. Speaking 
of the on-going security challenges facing the country, head of the UN Assistance Mission 
Nicholas Haysom called for greater effort on the part of the power sharing administration 
towards enhanced peace and stability and called for direct talks between the Taliban and the 
Afghan government (UN News, 2016).   
 
These considerations of power sharing as a means to address security issues point to one of the 
most challenging aspects of international mediation, namely the issue of whether and how to 
integrate former armed groups into the political process and power-sharing structures. Both the 
MSU and MST are sensitive to this challenge. For example, EU guidance on integrating former 
armed groups into mediation processes notes that power sharing can help incentivize groups 
away from violence and toward a political process. The guidance suggests that incentivising 
the leaders of such movements into power-sharing arrangements relies ‘on the assumption that 
if leaders are “transformed”, their members will follow’ (EEAS, 2012). This straightforward 
relationship between leaders and followers is qualified, however, by suggesting that ‘the 
choices made by leadership do not necessarily reflect the general preferences among the 
different groups’ and members of armed groups may choose not to follow. Power sharing is 
considered a ‘tactical’ solution to delivering a negotiated settlement and overcoming the 
adoption problem (personal interview, 2016). The focus remains on overcoming the adoption 
problem, even while anticipating problems in implementation.   
 
Perspective III: Democracy and Minority Rights 
 
In their respective conflict resolution efforts both the UN and the EU are committed to 
promoting liberal values on political participation, human rights and the protection of 
minorities. Although there is some variation between the two organisations on how to approach 
national minority rights (Kymlicka, 2008), their recommendations for power sharing are often 
framed as a way to help enhance the prospects of stable and inclusive democracy. 
 
The promotion of democracy and minority rights has been an important element of EU 
mediation activities, particularly in the Western Balkans as part of the Stabilisation and 
  12 
Association Process (SAP).5 Candidate countries must comply with the EU’s political criteria 
set out at the 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen by achieving ‘stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities’.6 Many of the policies recommended by the EU, OSCE and Council 
of Europe on minority rights ‘are recognizably consociational’ (Wilkinson, 2005: 243-44). In 
Macedonia, the negotiations leading to the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement focused on the 
inclusion of the ethnic Albanian community into the political institutions. At subsequent times 
of political crisis, the EU has helped stabilise the power-sharing arrangements by emphasising 
the need for minority inclusion in decision-making (McEvoy, 2015). In Bosnia, in supporting 
power sharing between the main ethnic groups, the EU has also sought to link the country’s 
progress towards accession with constitutional reforms to end discrimination against small 
minority groups beyond the three ‘constituent peoples’. The EU-led mediation on 
Kosovo/Serbia also seeks to address minority rights issues on the part of the Serb-majority 
community in northern Kosovo, leading to the 2013 agreement on power-sharing structures. 
 
The UN Guidance on Effective Mediation states that mediation must adhere to normative legal 
frameworks relating to ‘justice, truth and reconciliation, the inclusion of civil society, and the 
empowerment and participation of women in the process’ (UN, 2011: 16). Mediation takes 
place in cognisance of the UN 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities which sets standards for states adopting 
legislation on minority rights. These commitments to democracy and minority rights have 
informed UN mediation efforts. In Burundi, in cooperation with the African Union, the UN 
helped broker the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2001 and the 2005 
constitution, which provided for power sharing between the Hutu and Tutsi communities and 
an explicit recognition of minority rights (Gilbert, 2013). In Iraq, the 2005 constitution provides 
for a pluri-national federation with power sharing at the centre and a commitment to minority 
rights with the Kurdish language recognised as an official language and a guarantee for all 
Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue (Art.4, Constitution of Iraq, 2005). Our 
interviewees spoke of the need to ensure inclusion in government of the various groups in order 
to help prevent the peace agreement from falling apart. The transition of armed groups to 
political movements/parties in the political process is also acknowledged as a challenging but 
potentially important way to secure peace, stability and democracy (EEAS, 2012).  
 
Perspective IV: The Agnostic Approach 
 
The final strategy is to frame mediation interventions in technical rather than political terms. 
Neither explicitly pragmatic nor normative, this strategy defaults to playing a supportive role, 
deferring to the preferences of the conflict parties. This suggests that mediators do not 
necessarily recommend power sharing based on their own interests or preferences, but only do 
                                                 
5 The EU’s SAP establishes bilateral agreements between the EU and the states of the Western Balkans to 
establish a free trade area between the EU and these countries, to identify political and economic objectives and 
help prepare the countries on the path to EU accession.  
6 The monitoring of states’ compliance with developing international standards on minority rights has largely 
been undertaken by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012). 
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so at a technical level once the parties have already conceded that some kind of power sharing 
should form the basis of their agreement. Mediators, then, would be just as willing to facilitate 
some alternate arrangement, if this is what the parties prefer (personal interview, SBT member, 
2017). The role of such an agnostic mediator is to approach power sharing only in terms of its 
specific institutional configuration, and only then to lay out different institutional choices. This 
requires comparative expertise: ‘even if the last thing you want to do is get caught in a template, 
it is useful to see examples from other processes; you at least see things that you need to have 
thought about’ (personal interview, SBT member, 2016). Another former SBT member adds 
that the parties often seek out this comparative expertise, wanting to be reassured not only that 
what is proposed to them has been effective elsewhere but that such comparisons also reinforce 
their own existing preferences (personal interview, SBT member, 2017).   
 
This approach reflects wider attempts at the ‘depoliticization’ of mediation. That is, sensitive 
to any perception of external interference and needing the consent of parties for their 
involvement, the MSU has sought to frame its interventions as non-threatening, ‘emphasizing 
the technical nature of the issues at hand, rendering them seemingly apolitical’ (Convergne, 
2015: 191; see also UN, 2011: 25). Even names and titles are depoliticized. The MSU is 
specifically framed as a support unit rather than a mediation unit and in 2016 the titles of SBT 
members changed from ‘experts’ to ‘advisors.’ This reinforces the idea that the ‘advice 
provided by the unit’s experts may be disregarded by the requester’ (Convergne 2015: 192). 
The technical nature of the SBT was highlighted in our interviews: 
What the Standby Team does in a way is expand the imaginations of the parties; we try 
not to be too prescriptive and say “what we think you really need is this.”  What we 
would say is “look, we notice the sort of problems you’re having, what they did in this 
country was that and this, these were the lessons that they learned,” just to draw down 
a little bit of structure and to demonstrate the benefits and the drawbacks.  But we try 
to not really be too prescriptive (personal interview, MSU, 2016). 
Yet as one SBT team member noted, having the position of a power sharing expert/advisor 
may help to predetermine the contours of the agreement; rather than seeing power sharing as 
one of several governance strategies, it instead becomes the default option (personal interview, 
2017). To the extent that external actors prioritise thematic expertise on power sharing, this 
reflects current practice. The trend in peace settlements is to adopt some kind of power-sharing 
configuration; Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), for example, found that of the 38 peace agreements 
negotiated between 1945 and 1998, 37 contained power-sharing provisions while a search of 
the UN Peacemaker database returns 176 different agreements that contain provisions on 
political power sharing since 1989. Consequently, MSU could have reasonably anticipated 
requests for power sharing knowledge from the SBT. Indeed, such requests have been 
forthcoming: between 2008 and 2015, SBT power-sharing experts deployed 60 times.7 The 
risk, however, is that power sharing becomes a ‘catch-all’ solution (personal interview, 2017). 
 
                                                 
7 By comparison, there were 52 deployments on security arrangements, 54 on constitutions, 26 on gender and 
social inclusion, and, by the far the most popular, 85 for process design (Herrberg et al, 2015). Indeed, process 
design has been so in demand that MSU now ensures that all SBT members have some expertise in this area 
(personal interview, MSU, 2016). 
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An agnostic approach requires mediators to come to the table with no pre-determined 
preference for any one institutional design. The reason why they recommend power sharing, 
then, is connected to the parties’ desire for such arrangements and for the provision of expert 
knowledge. We suggest, however, that even though mediators may present such expertise as 
technical and driven by the parties’ preferences, any recommendation that reconfigures 
political institutions will have important political consequences.8 As Michael Kerr (2005, 38) 
suggests, the adoption of power sharing often align with the foreign policy interests of external 
actors in that ‘it allows powerful states to maintain a dominant role within regions where they 
have an interest, as any new consociation is almost entirely reliant on those who brought it into 
being’. Nonetheless, presenting power sharing as a compromise ‘technical’ solution addresses 
one of the biggest hurdles to successful conflict management – parties often have divergent, 
even irreconcilable, interests. If the parties have already committed to some form of power 
sharing, this agreement may form the basis for a longer-lasting settlement that persists in the 
implementation period. It is less clear, however, on how parties come to accept power sharing 




This article considers why external actors support the adoption of power-sharing arrangements, 
drawing from a series of semi-structured interviews with mediation actors at the UN and EU. 
In comparing the mediation support strategies of both organisations, we focused on how each 
approaches support for power sharing and how they factor the problems of adoption and 
implementation into their decision-making processes. Three themes are apparent. 
 
First, there is no single approach to power sharing either within or between the UN and EU; 
that is, there is ‘no single voice’ on power sharing as a mediation strategy. Both organisations 
adopt a broad understanding of what power sharing entails and those we interviewed gave 
different answers to why, how, and when power sharing gets recommended. Moreover, appeals 
to power sharing offer different rationales at different stages of the conflict; as one UN SBT 
member noted, at one stage, the appeal may be about minority rights and at another it can be 
framed in terms of security considerations (personal interview, 2017). Second, both 
organisations are keen to present their mediation work as technical, rather than about forcing 
particular approaches on actors. That is, they represent their work as being about ‘expanding 
the imagination’ of parties. Nonetheless, it is also clear that political factors influence 
negotiations, whether it is a pragmatic approach to achieve internal and regional security or 
normative support for international legal norms on self-determination and minority rights. 
Finally, in terms of how external actors approach the problems of adoption and 
implementation, our findings suggest a greater focus on the adoption problem. This contrasts 
with academic perspectives, which tend to focus on the functionality of power-sharing 
implementation (McGarry, 2017). This is not to say that external actors do not consideration 
                                                 
8 It is also interesting that some mediators who see value in power-sharing structures to help resolve conflict 
nevertheless see power sharing as a ‘quick-fix’ or institutional ‘sticking plaster’ to manage political disputes 
over power (personal interview, 2017). This reservation was expressed in relation to power sharing following 
contested elections and not as a means to manage self-determination disputes.  
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the challenges of implementation, but the priority of mediation support actors, after all, is to 
overcome the hurdle of adoption. Consequently, the analysis presented in this article 
demonstrates that over twenty years of international mediation efforts have established broad 
support for power sharing settlements and that this support derives from a mixture of 
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